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 (TRANS)FORMING TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII: 
“BECAUSE OF SEX” AND THE TRANSGENDER DILEMMA 
MARY KRISTEN KELLY* 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 22, 2009, a Colorado judge sentenced Allen Ray Andrade to life in 
prison for first degree murder and a hate crime.1  That hate crime was the 
bludgeoning to death of Angie Zapata, his date for the evening of July 16, 2008.2  
When Andrade discovered that Angie was a male to female transsexual, he flew 
into a rage and beat her to death with a fire extinguisher.3  Colorado is now one 
of the first states to convict a person of a hate crime for violence against a 
transgender individual, and LGBT groups applauded this conviction as a 
victory for transgender individuals in the United States.  There has recently been 
a push to pass federal legislation that would include “gender identity” in a list 
of protected characteristics that could qualify a crime as a hate crime, which is 
good news for the transgender community.  However, what if discrimination 
against transgender individuals can be stopped before a violent act occurs?  
What if the means to accomplish this already exist within the legal system? 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers protection against 
discrimination in the workplace based on certain enumerated characteristics, sex 
being one of them.  Title VII’s aim is to ensure that employment decisions are 
not made based on any characteristic other than an employee’s or applicant’s 
qualifications for the job.  Through these protections, we ensure that our 
workplace is diverse and that each individual hired or promoted is the best 
candidate for that position.  Title VII can also play a broader role in governing 
society, without becoming a general code of civility.  We aim to regulate the 
workplace not just out of concern for economic productivity but also because 
workplace regulation is a way in which we can purge individuals of their 
stereotypes and teach them to work with and interact with people they would 
not ordinarily, in hopes that what they learn will translate to other aspects of 
their daily lives.  Perhaps if Allen Ray Andrade had more exposure to 
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 1. See Nicholas Riccardi, Man guilty of hate crime, first degree murder in transgender slaying, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
transgender23-2009apr23,0,4138169.story. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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transgender individuals in this manner, this violent act would have been 
prevented. 
There is clear evidence that transgender individuals often experience 
discrimination at some point during the employment process.  Thirty-seven 
percent of transgender individuals nationwide report having experienced some 
form of employment discrimination.4  A 2003 survey of the transgender 
population in San Francisco revealed that one in two individuals who identify as 
transgender have experienced employment discrimination.5  When confronted 
with cases of clear discrimination against transgender individuals, most federal 
courts have refused to extend protection to them under Title VII on the basis of 
sex.  Courts rely on a trilogy of cases decided several years after Title VII was 
passed that interpret “sex” narrowly, and rely on outdated notions of how we 
now understand that term.  Since those cases were decided, Title VII 
jurisprudence has expanded the meaning of “sex” from simply male or female 
to include notions of sex stereotypes and gender non-conformity.  The courts 
have recognized claims for pregnancy discrimination, male on male sexual 
harassment, and so-called sex-plus claims, all of which transcend traditional 
interpretations of what discrimination “because of sex” means under Title VII.  
Yet when it comes to transgender plaintiffs, the courts revert to a strict 
interpretation of Title VII’s language.  Because one’s gender identity is 
inherently part of one’s sex, sex discrimination should necessarily include 
discrimination based on gender identity.  Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination has already been interpreted broadly in many types of cases, and 
the courts’ withholding of that broad interpretation for transgender individuals 
undermines much of the modern sex discrimination jurisprudence as well as the 
goals of Title VII itself as a remedial statute. 
Part I of this Note will explore the meaning of “transgender” as it is 
currently understood in the medical and psychological professions as well as 
within current LGBT communities.  Part II will explore the current legal 
landscape of the federal circuits’ interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination in the workplace in general as well as how this interpretation 
specifically applies – or, more often does not apply – to transgender employees.  
This section will also argue that the sex stereotyping claim alone is an 
insufficiently narrow cause of action for transsexual plaintiffs.  Part III of this 
Note will explore the ways in which state and local governments have reacted to 
interpretations of Title VII in interpreting their own employment and human 
rights laws or in drafting their own gender identity discrimination legislation 
and will suggest that federal courts heed the states’ approach in interpreting 
anti-discrimination legislation as remedial and therefore broad.  Part IV of this 
Note will focus on the implications of the debates surrounding the Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), its ultimate failure to include gender identity 
discrimination, and whether this failure will or should have broader 
consequences for the interpretation of what constitutes sex discrimination under 
 
 4. M.V. LEE BADGETT, ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE: CONSISTENT 
EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 7 *2007). 
 5. CHRIS DALEY & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 12 (2003). 
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Title VII.  Part V will then argue that the solution to finding a federal remedy for 
gender identity discrimination is through a broader interpretation of “sex” 
under Title VII in order to allow transgender employees a cause of action 
“because of” their transgender status and not simply through the often rejected 
and problematic gender stereotyping line of cases.  This section will also suggest 
that because “sex” under Title VII has already been interpreted quite broadly 
with respect to other kinds of sex discrimination claims, transsexual plaintiffs 
have been categorically excluded from a logical protection under the “because of 
sex” cause of action. 
I.  WHAT IS TRANSGENDER? 
As the transgender movement has gained momentum over the past thirty 
years,6 the term transgender has taken on many different incarnations.7  In most 
LGBT circles, transgender is used as an umbrella term that includes people who 
experience or express their gender in a way that runs against conventional 
expectations of how one should perceive and express his or her gender in 
relation to the sex listed on one’s birth certificate.8  In other words, transgender 
means that a person’s physiological sex is different from his or her psychological 
perception or expression of his or her sex.9  The term transgender has been used 
to describe individuals who identify as transsexuals or cross-dressers, as well as 
other gender-variant individuals.10  Transsexuals are individuals who have 
changed or who are in the process of changing their physical sex to conform to 
their inner sense of gender identity.11  The term transsexual can also refer to 
individuals who live full-time as a gender that is different from the one assigned 
to them at birth, but who do not undergo surgical procedures to alter their 
physical sex.12  Cross-dressers are people who wear the clothing usually worn 
by persons of the sex opposite to the one assigned to these individuals at birth.13  
Cross-dressers typically do not change their physical characteristics 
permanently, nor do they live full-time as a member of the opposite gender.14 
The gender transition process for transsexuals can include any of the 
following steps: hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery, telling one’s 
friends, family and co-workers, and changing one’s name and/or gender on 
 
 6. PAISLEY CURRAH, RICHARD M. JUANG & SHANNON PRICE MINTER, Introduction to Transgender 
Rights, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiii (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter eds. 
2006) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO TRANSGENDER RIGHTS]. 
 7. Id. at xiv–xv. 
 8. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, TRANSGENDER INCLUSION IN THE WORKPLACE 2 
(2008) [hereinafter HRC TRANSGENDER REPORT]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. Transsexual is not an umbrella term; many individuals who identify as transgender do 
not necessarily identify as transsexual. Id. Individuals who transition from male to female are 
referred to as MTFs or transwomen. Id. Those who transition from female to male are referred to as 
FTMs or transmen. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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legal documents.15  Gender transitions are usually supervised by a medical 
professional and are carried out according to regimented standards that have 
been developed by the medical community.16  The most commonly followed 
standards of care were developed by the Harry Benjamin International Gender 
Dysphoria Association, which is now known as the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH).17  These standards are generally 
highly successful, as very few transsexuals who undergo gender reassignment 
surgery report experiencing regret.18  The Human Rights Campaign observes 
that the degree of success of a gender transition is often strongly influenced by a 
person’s ability to maintain a stable job and income during the transition, as well 
as by support within the work environment.19 
Many transsexual individuals experience extreme discomfort from their 
internal sense that their gender identity does not match their physical bodies.20  
The medical profession has labeled this discomfort as “Gender Identity 
Disorder” (GID).21  This condition has also been known as “gender dysphoria,” 
and the two terms are often used interchangeably.22  The American Psychiatric 
Association lists GID as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).23  Transgender 
individuals do not always seek a diagnosis of GID because it carries a significant 
social stigma, as it labels them “disordered.”24  Many transgender people also do 
not seek a diagnosis because it is often done in preparation for sex reassignment 
surgery, and this surgery may not be an option financially for many transgender 
individuals, not to mention the medical risks involved with surgery.25 
The transgender population in the United States has never been measured 
concretely.26  There are studies that have attempted to measure the number of 
transgender individuals in the population, but most are based on the number of 
transsexuals that seek sex reassignment surgery.27  In evaluating these studies, 
which report the number of transsexual people to range anywhere from 0.25 to 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See World Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care, http:// 
www.wpath.org/publications_standards.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). 
 18. HRC TRANSGENDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. 
 19. Id. The Human Rights Campaign also provides a sample list of guidelines for employers to 
follow in implementing an internal set of gender transition guidelines for employees in order to 
ensure successful workplace transitions, id. at 26, and cite Chevron as an example of a company that 
has implemented a successful set of workplace gender transition guidelines. See CHEVRON, LGB AND 
T, TRANSGENDER @ CHEVRON (2008), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/workplace-
Chevron_Corp-Transition_Guidelines-Rev_2008.pdf. 
 20. HRC TRANSGENDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576 
(4th ed. 2000). 
 24. Katie Koch & Richard Bales, Transgender Employment Discrimination, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 
243, 248 (2008). 
 25. Id. 
 26. HRC TRANSGENDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 4. 
 27. Id. 
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one percent of the population, the Human Rights Campaign observed that they 
likely underestimate the actual transsexual population.28  The studies do not 
account for transsexuals that either have not undergone sex reassignment 
surgery, cannot have the surgery due to medical or financial reasons, or simply 
elect not to have the surgery.29  A recent study conducted at the University of 
Michigan found that 1 in every 2,000 to 4,500 people is a male to female 
transsexual.30  Though, the researchers point out that since many transsexuals 
do not come out to themselves or others, this range may be more along the lines 
of 1 in 1,000 to 2,000.31  This study also points out that more recent reports have 
estimated the number of male to female transsexuals to be more like 1 in 500, or 
0.2 percent of the population.32  Since this study and recent reports only take 
into account transsexualism, and the number of people who fall under the 
transgender umbrella appears to be much larger than just the transsexual 
population, Olyslager and Conway predict that the number of transgender 
individuals is 1 in 100, or one percent of the population.33 
Though there are standards and commonly used terms associated with 
gender variance that make it easier to talk about the issues without too much 
confusion, transgender individuals identify with certain genders to varying 
degrees, and some commentators have described transgenderism as “an 
expansive and complicated social category”34 or even a “gender galaxy.”35  
Regardless, as Paisley Currah noted in his article “Gender Pluralisms,” 
[t]hose working under the trans umbrella are seeking a world in which we have 
the luxury of disagreeing about gender without worrying about which narrative 
is more compelling to those who have the power to deny access to social 
services, to take away children, or to dismiss discrimination claims out of 
hand.36 
This paper seeks to work under the umbrella in precisely this way.  By 
broadening the interpretation of sex to include gender identity within the 
context of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace, 
employment protection can be afforded to transgender individuals who 
experience workplace discrimination, no matter on what end of the gender 
spectrum or what side of the “gender galaxy” they fall. 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Femke Olyslager & Lynn Conway, On the Calculation of the Prevalence of Transsexualism 23 
(2007), available at http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/Prevalence/Reports/Prevalence 
%20of%20Transsexualism.pdf (reporting that for female to male transsexuals the range is 1 in 5,500 
to 8,000). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. INTRODUCTION TO TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 6, at xv. 
 35. See Gordene O. MacKenzie, 50 Billion Galaxies of Gender, in RECLAIMING GENDERS 193, 216 
(Kate More & Stephen Whittle eds., 1999) (describing endlessly proliferating subsets of specific and 
historically located ways of crossing gender norms). 
 36. Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 24 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. 
Juang & Shannon Price Mintor eds., 2006). 
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II. CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII’S PROHIBITION ON SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Narrow Interpretation of “Because of Sex” under Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended in 1991, makes it 
unlawful to “refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”37  One of the elements of a plaintiff’s 
employment discrimination claim is proving that he or she falls into one of the 
protected categories enumerated in the statute, sex being one of them.  Both men 
and women are protected from sex discrimination under the statute.38  In cases 
involving transgender plaintiffs, federal courts have consistently interpreted 
“sex” to mean the traditional notion of biological sex - man or woman.39  In early 
cases, the courts seemed to adopt the same basic three part analysis of why 
“sex” does not include transgender individuals.  First, the courts looked to what 
they referred to as a plain language reading of the statute: sex means a biological 
man or a biological woman.40  Next, the courts pointed to the lack of legislative 
history surrounding the meaning of “sex” in refusing to interpret the term 
broadly.41  Finally the courts placed great emphasis on the fact that Congress 
had consistently rejected legislation that would have added sexual orientation to 
the list of protected characteristics, which the courts interpreted to mean that 
Congress did not intend to extend the meaning of “sex” in any context.42 
The first case in which a federal court confronted the notion of expanding 
the meaning of “sex” within the context of Title VII came thirteen years after the 
statute was enacted, in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.43  In this case, Ramona 
Holloway, a transsexual who began work at Arthur Andersen as Robert 
Holloway and who transitioned during her tenure at the firm, was terminated 
after she informed her supervisor that she was preparing for sex reassignment 
surgery and asked for her official documents to be changed to reflect her 
transition to the female gender.44  Before she was terminated, an official of the 
company suggested to Holloway that she might be happier at a new job where 
her transsexualism would be unknown.45  Holloway argued that discrimination 
against her because she was a transsexual was discrimination because of her sex 
and that such discrimination was unlawful under Title VII.46  In interpreting the 
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 38. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). 
 39. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[g]iving the 
statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ 
in mind”). 
 40. Id.; Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 41. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
 42. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
 43. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 44. Id. at 661. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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meaning of “sex,” the court pointed to the dearth of legislative history 
surrounding the addition of “sex” as a protected characteristic under Title VII, 
and based its conclusion on a traditional view of sex as biological man or 
woman, which the court referred to as a “plain meaning” reading of the 
statute.47  With no other definition of “sex” to look to, the court cited to the 
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary entry for “sex,” which defined the 
word as “either of two divisions of organisms distinguished respectively as male 
or female.”48  The court also adopted a truly formalistic view of the goal of the 
sex discrimination ban as codified in Title VII by concluding that Congress 
passed Title VII in order to “remedy the economic deprivation of women as a 
class” and that the case law is consistent in interpreting the sex discrimination 
ban as a means of placing “women on equal footing with men.”49  The Eighth 
Circuit considered similar questions in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.50  That 
case was somewhat different than the Holloway case in that a male to female 
transsexual employee was hired as a woman and then was fired for 
“misrepresenting herself as an anatomical female.”51  The court still followed the 
same plain language reading of “sex” under Title VII and based its decision to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s case on the fact that there was no evidence Congress 
intended to include transsexualism under Title VII.52 
These early interpretations of sex discrimination within the context of a 
transgender plaintiff’s Title VII claims continued to plague federal courts faced 
with similar arguments.  Several years after the Holloway decision, the Seventh 
Circuit dismissed a transgender plaintiff’s claim after the district court ruled for 
the first time that discrimination against a transsexual employee because she was 
transsexual was sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.53  In Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Kenneth (later Karen) Ulane was a male airline pilot who began 
transitioning to conform to her female identity eleven years after beginning 
 
 47. Id. at 662. Numerous commentators have speculated on the lack of legislative history 
surrounding the addition of “sex” as a protected characteristic in Title VII. The court in Holloway 
reasoned that Congress’s major concern in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was race 
discrimination and that sex was added as an afterthought, without any hearings or debate. Id. Some 
commentators claim that the addition of “sex” was an attempt by certain members of Congress to 
prevent the passage of the legislation altogether. See Koch & Bales, supra note 24, at 246 (citing the 
court’s reasoning in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)). But see Michael 
Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their 
Implications for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 453–54 (1981) (arguing against this 
point of view of the addition of “sex” to Title VII by analyzing judicial and scholarly attitudes 
toward the ban on sex discrimination). 
 48. WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 795 (1970). 
 49. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
 50. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 51. Id. at 748. This kind of plaintiff is referred to as a “stealth transgender” person by the 
Human Rights Campaign. HRC TRANSGENDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. The report points out that 
these individuals who transitioned before beginning work with a specific employer often do not 
disclose their transgender status for various reasons, such as concerns about discrimination or 
harassment. Id. There is more potential for stealth transgender employees in jurisdictions that allow 
transgender individuals to change their government records and other documentation to match their 
gender identity. Id. 
 52. Id. at 750. 
 53. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (Ulane II). 
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work for Eastern Airlines.54  After her sex reassignment surgery, the airline 
learned of her transsexualism and fired her.55  Agreeing with Ulane’s argument 
that sex necessarily includes gender identity, the district court (Ulane I) found 
that sex was “not a cut and dried matter of chromosomes,” but that it was “in 
part a psychological question of self-perception, and in part a social matter of 
how society perceives the individual.”56  The Ulane I court used this logic to 
determine that the plaintiff had been discriminated against because of her 
transsexuality and thus because of her sex.57  However the Seventh Circuit 
reversed, following much of the same logic as the Holloway court.58 
B. Sex Stereotyping Claims under Title VII 
 1. Price Waterhouse Establishes the Sex Stereotyping Claim 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins59 was the first time the Supreme Court 
acknowledged a specific cause of action under Title VII for sex stereotyping as 
sex discrimination.  Before this decision, the Supreme Court as well as lower 
federal courts had begun to move towards recognizing this type of claim both 
under equal protection jurisprudence as well as under Title VII.60  In the well-
known Price Waterhouse case, Ann Hopkins was the only woman out of eighty-
eight candidates for partnership in the year she was being considered.61  The 
record showed that she had secured a $25 million contract for the firm and had 
received very favorable reviews of her work.62  However twenty candidates, 
including Hopkins, were held back for reconsideration for partnership the next 
 
 54. Id. at 1082–83. 
 55. Id. at 1083–84. 
 56. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Ulane I). 
 57. See id. Interestingly, the court distinguished between transsexual plaintiffs and transvestites, 
reasoning that because transsexuals are people whose gender identity is opposite of that assigned to 
them at birth and “sex” necessarily includes gender identity, transsexuals should be protected by 
Title VII. Id. at 823. However, the court reasons that because transvestites (or cross-dressers, the 
more widely accepted term today) are “content” in the sex into which they are born, they do not 
have sexual identity problems and therefore do not fall within Title VII’s ambit of protection. Id. 
Judge Grady says in the opinion, “I have no problem with the idea that the statute was not intended 
and cannot reasonably be argued to have been intended to cover the matter of sexual preference, the 
preference of a sexual partner, or the matter of sexual gratification from wearing the clothes of the 
opposite sex. It seems to me an altogether different question as to whether the matter of sexual 
identity is comprehended by the word, ‘sex.’” Id. Based on current understandings of transgender 
individuals, cross-dressers and other gender-variant individuals who are not necessarily 
transsexuals are included under the transgender umbrella, express varying degrees of gender 
identity “disorders,” and thus should receive protection under Title VII. 
 58. Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
 59. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 60. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that law granting different 
benefits to men and women based on the stereotype that husbands were breadwinners and wives 
were dependents was sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Los Angeles Dep’t of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (“[I]n forbidding employers to discriminate 
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”). 
 61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
 62. Id. 
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year.63  Partners who opposed Hopkins’s partnership gave reasons such as she 
was “overly aggressive,” too “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” and needed “a course at charm school.”64  One partner told her she 
should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”65  This was the partner 
who informed Hopkins of the reasons why she failed to make partner that year, 
these reasons being among them.66  As a result, the Court held that Hopkins had 
not been promoted, at least in part, because she did not conform to feminine 
stereotypes associated with her female sex.67  In light of this, the Court held that 
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”68  Perhaps 
in the most influential statement of the opinion, the Court said “we are beyond 
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”69  Thus emerged 
the sex stereotyping, or gender nonconformity theory of sex discrimination 
which was successfully pleaded and proved by plaintiffs in lower federal courts 
after this decision. 
 2. Sex Stereotyping Claims for Transgender Plaintiffs 
After the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse, the transgender 
community was optimistic that since the Court had recognized sex stereotypes 
and social understandings of gender as part of sex discrimination under Title 
VII, transgender plaintiffs might now fare better under Title VII than they had 
previously under the approach followed in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane.70 
 C. A Successful Transgender Sex Stereotyping Claim: Smith v. City of Salem 
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to rule favorably on 
a transgender plaintiff’s sex stereotyping claim under Title VII in Smith v. City of 
Salem in 2004.71  The plaintiff in this case, Jimmie Smith, was a lieutenant with 
the Salem Fire Department.72  After seven years of employment with the City of 
Salem, she began expressing a feminine appearance and was diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder.73  After Smith’s co-workers began questioning her 
about her appearance and commenting that her mannerisms were not 
“masculine enough,” Smith informed her supervisor of her diagnosis.74  Once 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 235. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 237. 
 68. Id. at 250. 
 69. Id. at 251. 
 70. See Joel W. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 222 (2007). 
 71. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 72. Id. at 568. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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word of her diagnosis and of her intention to transition from male to female 
traveled to higher-ups in the fire department and to the Law Director of the City 
of Salem, officials of the fire department and the City met to formulate a plan for 
Smith’s termination.75  This plan included forcing Smith to undergo three 
psychological examinations with physicians selected by the City.76  This was a 
ploy to get Smith to resign or to refuse to comply, because if she refused to 
comply she could be terminated on the grounds of insubordination.77  Smith 
obtained legal representation and refused to comply with the plan – she was 
suspended and then after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit in federal court alleging, 
among other things, sex discrimination based on her transsexuality.78 
Smith brought her suit as a male plaintiff with GID.79  The district court 
dismissed her claim of sex discrimination on the grounds that she invoked the 
“term of art” of sex stereotyping established by Price Waterhouse in order to 
create an end run around her real claim which was based upon her 
transsexuality, for which Title VII does not provide protection.80  The Sixth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Price Waterhouse had confirmed that gender 
discrimination was necessarily a part of the prohibition of sex discrimination – 
that Ann Hopkins was not promoted to the partnership because her appearance 
and mannerisms failed to conform to the employer’s expectations of how a 
woman should look and act.81  The Sixth Circuit found that Smith sufficiently 
pleaded a claim of sex stereoptying through her allegations that coworkers 
made statements about her appearance and mannerisms, and that her failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes of how a man should look and behave was the 
“driving force” behind the employer’s actions.82 
The Sixth Circuit went even further than this, holding that Price Waterhouse 
had eviscerated the logic used in the previous cases dismissing transgender 
employees’ claims.83  The court reasoned that these prior cases (Sommers, 
Holloway, and Ulane) had all relied on the notion that Title VII’s prohibition of 
sex discrimination did not also include gender discrimination.84  The Sixth 
Circuit then pointed out that courts that refused to allow transgender plaintiffs 
to bring sex stereotyping claims were in essence making a false distinction 
between them and plaintiffs such as Ann Hopkins: “these courts superimpose 
classifications such as ‘transsexual’ on a plaintiff, and then legitimize 
discrimination based on the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity by formalizing the 
non-conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification.”85  According to 
the Sixth Circuit, after Price Waterhouse an employer who discriminates against a 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 569. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 570. 
 80. Id. at 571. 
 81. Id. at 571–72. 
 82. Id. at 572. 
 83. Id. at 573. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 574. 
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man who wears makeup and dresses is just as liable for sex discrimination on 
the basis of sex stereotyping as an employer who discriminated against a 
woman because she did not wear dresses or makeup.86 
D. Remaining Roadblocks for Transgender Plaintiffs 
In cases like Smith v. City of Salem, the prospect of bringing claims based on 
sex stereotyping after Price Waterhouse looked very optimistic for transgender 
employees.  Many plaintiffs in the early 2000s brought successful sex 
stereotyping claims, reaffirming the strength of this claim, though not many 
were brought by transgender plaintiffs.87  The Sixth Circuit also followed its 
reasoning in Smith v. City of Salem when it decided Barnes v. City of Cincinnati in 
2005.88 
However, outside of the Sixth Circuit and even in one case within the Sixth 
Circuit, transgender plaintiffs have not been successful in bringing these sex 
stereotyping claims for a variety of reasons.  A major roadblock for transgender 
plaintiffs under the sex stereotyping line of cases is that gender neutral policies 
may bar their claims.  The Tenth Circuit in 2007 dismissed a transgender 
employee’s claim based on a gender neutral restroom policy.89  In this case the 
court agreed that the plaintiff had established a prima facie sex stereotyping 
claim, but dismissed the claim on the basis of the employer’s asserted 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff: the plaintiff’s intent to 
use the women’s restrooms when she was actually a biological male.90  A district 
court in Indiana followed similar reasoning in dismissing a transgender 
employee’s sex stereotyping claim on the basis of a gender neutral dress code.91  
The court again recognized that the plaintiff had successfully established a sex 
stereotyping claim as a transgender employee; however, since as a male to 
female transsexual the plaintiff did not conform to the grooming standard’s 
requirement that males maintain a conservative “socially acceptable” 
appearance, the employer was able to offer this noncompliance as a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination.92  As long as courts 
interpret Title VII to allow for “gender-neutral” policies such as these, 
employers will be able to use these policies as pretext for termination of 
transgender plaintiffs because of their transgender status.  When a plaintiff 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining 
that gender stereotyping of a male gay employee by his male co-workers is actionable harassment 
under Title VII); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
plaintiff may prove sex discrimination claim by showing that “harasser’s conduct was motivated by 
a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender”); Nichols v. Azteca 
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (deciding that harassment “based upon the 
perception that the plaintiff is effeminate is discrimination because of sex in violation of Title VII”). 
 88. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that a transgender plaintiff did not have Article III standing to bring the discrimination 
action and holding that under Smith, transgender plaintiffs are members of a protected class). 
 89. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 1225–26. 
 91. Creed v. Family Express Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237 (N.D. Ind. 2009). 
 92. Id. at *28–29. 
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challenges a dress code or restroom policy based on notions of sex stereotyping 
and gender role expectations as these plaintiffs did, a court’s finding that the 
policy equally burdens male and female employees will always be a fatal blow 
to these claims. 
Courts have found other ways to poke holes in transgender plaintiffs’ sex 
stereotyping claims.  In order to bring successful sex stereotyping claims, 
transgender plaintiffs have had to present specific, direct evidence that 
employers took adverse employment actions against them because of gender 
stereotypes, and not because of their transgender status per se.93  Arguably, in 
order for any plaintiff to establish a sex stereotyping claim, there must be direct 
evidence of stereotyping behavior – this is the essence of the claim.  Otherwise 
the plaintiff would bring the claim as a “because of sex” claim based on 
circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination.  In Myers v. Cuyahoga County, the 
otherwise sympathetic Sixth Circuit dismissed a transgender plaintiff’s claim 
because the only evidence she was able to show was that her supervisor referred 
to her as a “he/she,” which the court recognized was deeply offensive to her as 
a transgender individual, but held did not rise to the level of direct evidence of 
stereotyping that is required.94  The sex stereotyping theory will clearly only be 
successful for transgender plaintiffs under certain fact scenarios when 
statements such as “you are too masculine for a woman,” or “you are too 
feminine for a man” are made to the employee.  It is today’s reality in 
workplaces that the chances of co-workers making these types of comments out 
loud are fairly slim.  In a politically correct world, it would be a “lucky” 
transgender plaintiff who is able to make a sex stereotyping claim on such 
damaging direct evidence as this.  Thus, reliance on the sex stereotyping theory 
is simply too narrow a protection for transgender plaintiffs under Title VII. 
Sex stereotyping claims can also be problematic for transgender plaintiffs in 
the sense that this type of claim forces the transgender employee to assert a 
claim either as too feminine of a man or too masculine of a woman.  The 
majority of recorded decisions concerning stereotyping of transgender plaintiffs 
involve a male to female transsexual.95  This means that an individual who has 
made or is in the process of making a transition from male to female must hold 
herself out to be a feminine male when she in fact identifies as female.  The court 
in Schroer v. Billington alluded to this issue in its recent opinion, but reasoned 
that it did not matter whether the employer perceived the plaintiff as a 
masculine woman or a feminine man – the claim was still based on sex 
stereotyping.96  Regardless of the Schroer court’s broad interpretation of the sex 
stereotyping claim, formulating this type of claim based on a gender with which 
 
 93. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding direct evidence of 
stereotyping from partners’ comments regarding the plaintiff’s looks and mannerisms); Schroer v. 
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.C. 2008) (“Schroer’s case indeed rests on direct evidence, and 
compelling evidence, that the Library’s hiring decision was infected by sex stereotypes.”). 
 94. Myers v. Cuyahoga County, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13693, *26 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 95. See, e.g., Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295; Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 
661 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 96. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306. 
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the plaintiff no longer identifies may be problematic, especially for those who 
are still going through the gender transition process.97 
III. CURRENT STATE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TRANSGENDER EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS: AN ENLIGHTENING LINE OF REASONING FOR FEDERAL 
COURTS 
Transgender plaintiffs have fared somewhat better at the state level than 
under Title VII.  As a response to the failure of Title VII to extend protection to 
transgender plaintiffs, there is a growing trend among the states to either 
include sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in their existing 
employment discrimination statutes or to create new statutes that deal 
specifically with discrimination against these individuals.  As of January 1, 2009, 
one hundred and three cities and counties had enacted statutes that prohibit 
gender identity discrimination by both public and private employers.98  Thirteen 
states and the District of Columbia have also enacted their own gender identity 
discrimination statutes.99  However, when the populations of these states are 
taken into account, the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force finds that only thirty-
nine percent of the population in the United States is covered by 
nondiscrimination laws that include gender identity.100  This suggests that while 
states are recognizing the need for transgender-inclusive laws, this piecemeal 
approach to providing protection to transgender employees is inadequate.101  
However, the thirty-nine percent statistic can also be seen in a positive light: the 
growing number of states that have enacted transgender-inclusive anti-
discrimination laws is evidence that there is a national trend to recognize 
transgender rights, which could be persuasive to federal courts that are deciding 
whether transgender plaintiffs should be afforded protection under Title VII. 
New York and New Jersey have interpreted their own employment laws 
that do not specifically provide for gender identity discrimination to protect 
transgender employees.102  These decisions focus on the remedial nature of anti-
discrimination legislation and hold that through this lens of analyzing the 
purpose and the policies underlying Title VII, which serves as a model for both 
 
 97. See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal 
Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 95 (2008) (pointing out that in order for a transgender 
plaintiff to prevail on a sex stereotyping claim, she must “anchor” herself in a statutorily-protected 
biological sex from which she behaviorally deviates). 
 98. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, CITIES AND COUNTIES WITH NON-DISCRIMINATION 
ORDINANCES THAT INCLUDE GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (2009), http://www.hrc.org/issues/ 
workplace/equal_opportunity/9602.htm. 
 99. These states are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK 
FORCE, JURISDICTIONS WITH EXPLICITLY TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS (2008), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/all_jurisdictions_w_pop_8_08.pdf. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. New Jersey has since amended the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to include 
gender identity discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-12 (West 2009). 
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of these states’ employment laws, the federal courts’ interpretation of “sex” to 
explicitly exclude transsexuals is too narrow.103 
1. New York – Maffei v. Kolaeton Industries 
In 2004, a New York state court decided that a transsexual plaintiff could 
assert a sex discrimination claim under New York’s employment discrimination 
statute because she was a transsexual.104  Diane Maffei worked at Kolaeton 
starting in 1986 as a female employee.105  She consistently received favorable 
reviews of her work along with salary raises and bonuses on a consistent 
basis.106  In 1994, she underwent sexual reassignment surgery and returned to 
work as Daniel.107  Upon his return to work, Maffei claimed that his supervisor 
degraded him, called him names, and stripped him of many of his 
responsibilities at work.108  He brought a hostile work environment claim due to 
this harassment.109  The defendant employer made similar arguments as 
employers who have faced these types of claims from employees under Title 
VII, since the New York statute was similarly worded in terms of its prohibition 
of sex discrimination in the workplace.110  The employer argued that as a 
transsexual the plaintiff was not part of a protected class and therefore could not 
bring a sex discrimination claim.111  The court first looked to Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines and rejected the reasoning as unduly restrictive, citing the fact that the 
common understanding of “sex” by experts today is that sex is determined by 
seven different factors,112 including self-identity.113  The court determined that 
courts such as Ulane, Sommers, and Holloway were flawed in their reasoning that 
Congressional attempts to include sexual orientation among the list of protected 
characteristics signaled an intent to exclude transgender individuals from 
protection.114  The court also pointed to the remedial nature of 
antidiscrimination statutes – they should be interpreted liberally to achieve their 
intended purposes (to prevent discrimination of any group, majority or 
minority).115  Though the discrimination statutes were designed to protect 
women and minorities, they now extend protection to males and whites.116  
Thus by looking at the broader idea of why governments (both federal and state) 
enact anti-discrimination laws, the court concluded that “sex” should be given a 
 
 103. Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1995). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 391. 
 106. Id. at 392. 
 107. Id. at 391-92. 
 108. Id. at 392. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. The factors the court listed were: (1) chromosomes (XX female, XY male); (2) gonads 
(ovaries or testes); (3) hormonal secretions (androgens for males or estrogens for females); (4) 
internal reproductive organs (uterus or prostate); (5) external genitalia; (6) secondary sexual 
characteristics; and (7) self-identity. Id. at 394. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 395. 
 115. Id. at 394–95. 
 116. Id. at 395. 
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broad interpretation and should apply to transgender plaintiffs even if Congress 
did not consider these individuals when the statutes were enacted. 
2. New Jersey – Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems 
A New Jersey state court followed similar reasoning to the Maffei court in 
holding that New Jersey sex discrimination provisions protected a transgender 
employee who was working as the medical director for West Jersey Health 
Systems.117  The plaintiff, Enriquez began transitioning from male to female after 
one year of employment and subsequently received a diagnosis of gender 
identity disorder.118  Co-workers began to comment on her appearance, and 
soon after she was notified that her contract would be terminated.119  When she 
contacted the company to inquire about renewing her contract, she was told, 
“[N]o one’s going to sign this contract unless you stop this business that you’re 
doing.”120  Enriquez brought a sex discrimination claim under New Jersey’s 
employment statute.121  The Enriquez court, like the Maffei court, rejected the 
federal circuits’ interpretations of sex discrimination to exclude transgender 
employees finding these decisions to be too restrictive.122  The court cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, noting that notions of gender 
should be taken into account when deciding what “sex” means within the 
context of an employment discrimination statute.123  Thus, the court concluded 
that “sex” discrimination under the New Jersey statute necessarily included 
gender discrimination.124 
While interpreting their own statutes that prohibit discrimination in the 
workplace on the basis of sex, these two states provide transgender employees 
with important protection against discrimination, and explicitly reject the 
federal circuits’ exclusion of these individuals.  The reasoning used in both cases 
is applicable in rejecting the federal courts’ reasoning that Congress necessarily 
intended to exclude transgender individuals from Title VII because the initial 
groups targeted by the legislation were women and minorities (as protections 
have now been extended to men and whites), as well as the idea that simply 
because Congress has consistently struck down legislation that would establish 
sexual orientation as a protected status, Congress has no intention of protecting 
transgender employees against gender identity discrimination.  These cases also 
stand for the idea that sex necessarily includes concepts of gender identity, and 
that “sex discrimination” within the context of an anti-discrimination statute 
should be read liberally to protect routinely discriminated-against groups. 
 
 117. Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 118. Id. at 368. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 369. 
 122. Id. at 372–73. 
 123. Id. at 371–72. 
 124. Id. at 373. 
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IV. THE EMPLOYMENT NONDISCRIMINATION ACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII 
The Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) has gone through many 
incarnations over the years.  First versions were proposed as amendments to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,125 though after numerous attempts at an amendment 
failed, proponents of the bill suggested and proposed a stand-alone bill that 
would protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as 
gender identity.126  This stand-alone bill did not contain Title VII’s disparate 
impact claims and was stripped of affirmative action as a remedy for proven 
discrimination.127  The final version of the bill that passed in the House of 
Representatives in 2007 did not contain protection for discrimination against 
transgender employees.128  The bill’s sponsor, Barney Frank, agreed to remove 
gender identity discrimination from the bill because it was clear that a bill 
containing this language would not pass a House vote.129  Many advocacy 
groups withdrew their support from the bill because of this change.130 
The controversy surrounding ENDA and gender identity could have 
several possible outcomes for federal courts that are wrestling with whether 
gender identity is necessarily included in Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination.  First, courts could interpret this as a clear sign of Congressional 
intent to exclude transgender individuals from protection under Title VII.  This 
line of reasoning would fall in line with the trilogy of early cases that relied 
upon Congress’s continual failure to pass legislation that would offer protection 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.131  Though in the case of 
ENDA, the case would be even stronger for this kind of argument – the courts in 
Ulane, Sommers, and Holloway were misguided in equating sexual orientation 
with gender identity and transgender status132 but here, one could argue that in 
removing “gender identity” from ENDA, this is an even clearer indication of 
Congress’s intent. 
However, in the recent case of Schroer v. Billington, the court considered 
and rejected the employer-defendant’s argument that the failure of Congress to 
include gender identity in ENDA was a clear sign of Congressional intent that 
 
 125. Failed versions include S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 4636, 
103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 2074, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 8269, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 166, 94th Cong. 
(1975). 
 126. The text of the bill that included language regarding sexual orientation as well as gender 
identity discrimination is in H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 127. Id. 
 128. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 129. 153 CONG. REC. H13228–52 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2007). 
 130. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, POLICY STATEMENT ON ENDA, available at http:// 
www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/12346.htm (stating that Human Rights Campaign will only 
support a trans-inclusive version of ENDA). 
 131. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (“this court 
will not expand Title VII’s application in the absence of Congressional mandate”). 
 132. Note that many LGBT activists insist that we keep these terms separate. Sexual orientation is 
one’s sexual proclivity towards one sex or the other, while transgender is one’s identity as male, 
female, or something different altogether. 
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transgender individuals should not receive protection under Title VII.133  The 
court was not prepared to accept such a narrow reading of “sex” under Title VII, 
and followed the plaintiff’s alternative suggestion for interpretation of this 
legislative history: that some members of Congress believe the Ulane court and 
other early transgender discrimination cases interpreted “sex” too narrowly 
under Title VII.134  According to this explanation Title VII does not require 
amendment, but a corrected interpretation of “sex.”135  According to the 
Supreme Court, the history of subsequent legislation is not a valid basis for 
inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.136  This is especially true when 
interpreting Congress’s intent within the context of a proposal that fails to 
become a law.137  Congressional inaction lacks the persuasive significance of 
Congressional action because it is possible to make multiple interferences about 
the bases for Congress’s decisions, including the inference that previous 
legislation already incorporated the offered change.138  ENDA’s failure could 
therefore serve either to undermine or bolster transgender plaintiffs’ sex 
discrimination claims under Title VII.  Another alternative is that courts will 
find ENDA’s latest failure to be unenlightening as to the transgender debate 
because this legislation had many other flaws and was destined to fail for those 
alone, such as the lack of a disparate impact cause of action. 
V. THE SOLUTION: SCHROER V. BILLINGTON’S SUGGESTION OF A BROADER 
INTERPRETATION OF “SEX” UNDER TITLE VII 
A. Schroer v. Billington Allows Transgender Plaintiff’s “because of sex” claim to 
stand 
In 2008, a district court in the District of Columbia decided that 
discrimination against a transsexual plaintiff constituted not just sex 
stereotyping, but discrimination because of the plaintiff’s sex.139  Diane Schroer 
was a male to female transsexual who applied for the position of Specialist in 
Terrorism and International Crime with the Library of Congress in the 
Congressional Research Service.140  She was no doubt qualified for the position 
as she had attended the National War College and the Army Command and 
General Staff College.141  When she applied for the position she had already 
been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and was working with a clinical 
social worker to develop a plan for her transition from male to female.142  She 
 
 133. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.C. 2008). 
 134. Id. (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)). 
 135. One commentator has suggested amendments to Title VII itself rather than standalone 
legislation like ENDA. She recommends that “sex” be amended to “gender” in Title VII to prevent 
further confusion surrounding the interpretation of “sex.” See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, 
A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 209, 210 (2008). 
 136. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 295. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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applied for the position as David Schroer.143  When Schroer met with her 
potential supervisor before she was to begin work, she dressed in masculine 
attire but informed the supervisor of her intention to undergo sexual 
reassignment surgery and that she would be starting work as Diane Schroer.144  
This exchange resulted in Schroer’s offer being rescinded by her supervisor.145  
The supervisor cited reasons such as concern that Schroer’s contacts would no 
longer want to work with her because of her transgender status, her credibility 
when testifying before Congress could be compromised because everyone 
would know she had transitioned, concern that Schroer was not trustworthy 
because she was not up-front about her transition during her initial interviews, 
her transition might distract her from the job, and finally that it would affect her 
ability to obtain security clearance.146  The court found many of these concerns 
to be pretextual147 and went on to find that Schroer had proved both a sex 
stereotyping claim as well as a claim “because of sex” under Title VII.148  
Following the reasoning in Smith v. City of Salem and Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 
Judge Robertson found that Schroer had successfully alleged a sex stereotyping 
claim.149  However, in a previous opinion on a motion to dismiss, Judge 
Robertson held that sex stereotyping claims for transgender plaintiffs must arise 
from the employee’s appearance or conduct and the employer’s stereotypical 
perceptions.150  A Price Waterhouse claim cannot be supported by the facts 
showing that an adverse employment action resulted solely from the plaintiff’s 
disclosure of her gender identity disorder.151  This reasoning reflects the 
problematic aspects of sex stereotyping claims for transgender individuals 
referenced in Part II, supra.  Presenting direct evidence of an employer’s 
statements about an employee’s appearance or conduct can be especially 
difficult.  Upon further review of the facts on summary judgment, the court 
found that Schroer’s sex stereotyping claim was saved by the fact that she was 
able to present direct evidence: the decisionmaker (the supervisor) admitted that 
when she saw photographs of Schroer she saw a man in women’s clothing.152  
The supervisor also admitted that she viewed Schroer’s army background as 
making her an especially masculine type of man which made her 
comprehension of her gender transition more difficult.153  The court viewed this 
evidence as support for the allegation that the employer’s decision was “infected 
by sex stereotypes.”154 
Judge Robertson pointed to the difficulties that transgender employees 
have faced in bringing sex stereotyping claims because direct evidence of 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 296. 
 145. Id. at 299. 
 146. Id. at 297–98. 
 147. Id. at 300-02. 
 148. Id. at 308. 
 149. Id. at 304–05. 
 150. Id. at 304. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 305. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look too much like discrimination 
based on transsexuality itself to courts.155  However, Judge Robertson ruled that 
even if Schroer’s claim was based on transsexuality itself, she could still have 
maintained a claim of sex discrimination because of her sex.156  Gender identity 
necessarily is a part of sex and therefore Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination must include discrimination based on one’s sense of gender 
identity.157  This ruling was especially important because the court decided this 
explicitly, “based on the language of the statute itself.”158  The court even went 
so far as to hold that a transsexual could bring a claim as an inherently gender 
non-conforming transsexual.159 
Similar to Judge Robertson’s reasoning in Schroer, there was a portion of the 
decision in Smith v. City of Salem discussed in Part II, supra, that was deleted 
from the final released opinion under threat of an en banc review due to the 
strength of the language it used.160  In the unreleased version of the opinion, 
Judge Cole went so far as to say that if Smith had brought her claim as a 
transsexual individual and not just as a sex stereotyping claim, that her claim 
would still be viable.161  In other words, Judge Cole believed that even if Smith 
had not been able to point to specific instances in which coworkers or 
supervisors had criticized her mannerisms and appearance – evidence that is 
integral to a claim of sex stereotyping – Smith should still have been able to 
make out a claim of sex discrimination based on her transgender status.  Though 
this section of the original opinion does not appear in the corrected form of the 
opinion released a few months later, this was the beginning of an understanding 
that discrimination against a transgender employee may be discrimination 
because of his or her sex. 
B. Broad Interpretations of “Sex” Under Title VII 
The Schroer opinion marks a broadening of the interpretation of “sex” 
under Title VII for transgender plaintiffs, but since the beginning of Title VII 
jurisprudence courts have been moving away from the original meaning of 
“sex” (man or woman).  The courts’ narrow interpretation of “sex” when a 
plaintiff presents a claim based on his or her transgender status can in fact be 
seen as an exception to the broader interpretations of “sex” that have been 
embraced by courts in other types of sex discrimination cases.  When the Schroer 
 
 155. Id. at 308. 
 156. Id. at 306–08. 
 157. Id. at 306. 
 158. Id. at 306. 
 159. Id. at 304–05. 
 160. Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912, 921 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 161. Id. (“Even if Smith had alleged discrimination based solely on his self-identification as a 
transsexual – as opposed to his specific appearance and behavior – this claim too is actionable 
pursuant to Title VII. By definition, transsexuals are individuals who fail to conform to stereotypes 
about how those assigned a particular sex at birth should act, dress, and self-identify. Ergo, 
identification as a transsexual is the statement or admission that one wishes to be the opposite sex or 
does not relate to one’s birth sex. Such an admission – for instance the admission by a man that he 
self-identifies as a woman and/or that he wishes to be a woman – itself violates the prevalent sex 
stereotype that a man should perceive himself as a man.”). 
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court held that “analysis must begin and end with the language of the 
statute,”162 the court was referring to the already broad interpretation of sex that 
other courts have systematically brushed aside when confronted with 
transgender plaintiffs.  One of the first indications that Congress intended a 
broad meaning of “sex” under Title VII was the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act.163  After the Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Ailleo,164 holding that 
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination and embracing the narrow 
view of “because of sex” that pregnancy discrimination simply distinguished 
between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons, Congress responded by 
redefining “because of sex” to include “because of pregnancy.”165  This indicates 
intent on the part of Congress, even early in Title VII litigation, to show that 
“sex” means more than just being female or being male; rather, “sex” 
encompasses ideas of gender roles and norms that are associated with each 
sex.166 
Similar to the expansion of the understanding of “because of sex” to 
include “because of pregnancy,” the courts have recognized sex discrimination 
claims in a line of cases that are often referred to as “sex-plus” claims.  Courts 
have developed an involved jurisprudence regarding claims that an employer 
has a policy that classifies employees on the basis of sex plus another 
characteristic such as parenthood, race, age, marital status, or child-bearing 
ability.  Plaintiffs in these claims allege that the employer has discriminated 
against a specific subclass of one sex.  For example, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corporation the Supreme Court held that the employer, who refused to hire 
women with pre-school age children but did hire men with children, violated 
Title VII because the statute prohibited using separate hiring policies for men 
and women.167  Though these claims are based on differential treatment of men 
and women, the notion that other characteristics such as race, age, or childcare 
could play into a determination that the discrimination in question was 
motivated by sex is also a move away from traditional interpretations of sex.  It 
is also interesting to note that both the Phillips case and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act were changes in Title VII jurisprudence that occurred almost 
simultaneously with the first three cases to address transgender employment 
discrimination.  This tends to indicate that since courts were willing to apply 
broader interpretations of “sex” in some situations, but refused categorically to 
extend protection to transsexuals during the same time period, courts were 
devising a way to specifically exclude transsexuals from protection. 
Finally, what should have been the proverbial nail in the coffin for the three 
early cases rejecting transsexual plaintiffs’ claims of sex discrimination was the 
 
 162. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989)). 
 163. P.L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 164. 417 U.S. 484 (1972). 
 165. P.L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 166. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
209, 211 (2008) (“A Court that can perceive sex discrimination in the denial of caretaking leave has 
come a long way since Geduldig.”). 
 167. 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971). 
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case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.168  In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII.169  
The Justices saw no need for a categorical rule against male on male harassment 
in the workplace because “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal 
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of 
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”170  This language directly undermines the holdings of Holloway, 
Ulane, and Sommers, which hold steadfast to the principal evil that Congress 
contemplated in passing Title VII: that there were not equal employment 
opportunities for men and women.  Justice Scalia’s extension of Title VII to 
“comparable evils” in Oncale leads directly to the argument that discrimination 
against transsexual plaintiffs because they are transsexual is a comparable evil to 
discrimination against women because they are women, and thus under the 
language of Title VII discrimination based on transsexualism is discrimination 
based on sex.171  However, as one commentator has suggested, a logical 
consistency is not always sufficient to change the minds of judges.172  Sometimes 
the will of the public has to be at the tipping point before the courts recognize 
that a disfavored group deserves protection under existing statutory law.173  
There is quite a bit of evidence that the will of the public is heading in that 
direction, however, with current legislative developments at the state level, 
discussed in Part III, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Sex discrimination under Title VII is broad, except when the plaintiff is a 
transsexual.  Federal courts have blindly followed a trilogy of decisions whose 
reasoning has essentially been overturned by decades of jurisprudence 
expanding the meaning of “sex” under the statute to include notions of gender 
norms and non-conformity as well as “comparable evils” to those envisioned by 
Congress in 1964.  Perhaps because transsexualism is a foreign concept to many 
courts, the notion of reading such a categorical exclusion into Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination was not as problematic as it was to the Court 
in Oncale in the case of male on male sexual harassment.  However, federal 
courts should look to the remedial nature of anti-discrimination laws, as many 
of the states have done, to find that the overarching policies of Title VII dictate 
the extension of protection to transsexuals as a disadvantaged, discriminated 
against group in the workplace.  Though it is indisputable that Congress did not 
have transsexual plaintiffs in mind in 1964, the intent of Congress is certainly 
not the end of the inquiry.  As the sex stereotyping claim has proven not to be 
the premier tool in vindicating transsexual plaintiffs’ rights under Title VII, the 
broader “because of sex” rationale must carry the day. 
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